2. Definitions and main result. Let the set of players be N = {l, • • • , #}. For each SCN> let E 8 be the Euclidean space of dimension | S\ whose coordinates are indexed by the players in 5. If u^E N then u 8 will denote its projection onto E 8 . If x and y are vectors we say x^y if x^y and x^y.
We use Qs and Qg to denote respectively the nonnegative and the strictly positive orthant in E 8 , i.e., fls= {x££ 5 |x^0}, and fis + = {xGE 8 \x>0}.
For our purposes we will use the following definition of an w-person game with no side payments.
DEFINITION. An ^-person game without side payments r = { Vs} SCN is a collection of sets satisfying the following conditions:
( 
3. Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of existence is a consequence of a series of lemmas which will be stated in this section. The idea of proof will be indicated for two of them. 
PROOF. The case where V 8 r\Qt = 0 is trivial. If V s r\Q+5*0, we consider the map Os which projects V$ onto H s along rays through the origin, and show it is a homeomorphism. That it is one-to-one follows from Lemma 2, and that it is onto is a consequence of comprehensiveness. We define (frs^Os 1 -It is clear that <f>s is of the required form, and that ds has the required properties.
The final lemma is a generalization of a result of Pel eg [9] , which is in turn a generalization of a well-known result of Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz [7] (see also [6, pp. 310-311] ). 4. Applications. In this section, various attempts (none completely successful) to use Theorem 1 to generalize the classical bargaining set to games without side payments will be discussed.
Define the binary relation i>(x)j to mean a i has a justified objection againstp as in [10, p. 198] . Now let each of the relations R k (x) be the negation of > (x). Then the bargaining set so defined is the one treated by Peleg in [lO] , and, as we noted earlier, the existence theorem is false for this set. In terms of Theorem 1, hypothesis (c) fails in general for this case. However, in games of pairs (see [lO] ), the theorem does apply, and we get a mild generalization of [10, Theorem 2.4, p. 199] (where convexity of each Vs was assumed).
Now consider, at each x, the directed graph G(x) of the relation >(x). We may define iR k (x)j to mean whenever there is a directed path in G(x) from i toj, then there is also a directed path fromj to i. The bargaining set so defined can be shown to be equivalent to the classical bargaining set in games with side payments. However existence is an open question. Theorem 1 does not apply here since hypothesis (a) is not satisfied. We remark that a point XQ in this bargaining set is characterized by G(x Q ) having the property that each of its connected components is strongly connected (i.e. between any two vertices i and j there is a directed path from i to j).
The previous definition can be changed in such a way as to satisfy hypothesis (a). Define i^>(x)j if #£closure({x|i>(#)j}). Let H(x) be the graph of ^>(x). Define iR k (x)j to mean whenever there is an arc from i toj in G(x) then there is a directed path from j to i in H(x). Theorem 1 can be applied here to guarantee existence. However the bargaining set so defined does not necessarily agree with the classical bargaining set for games with side payments, as the following example shows.
EXAMPLE. Let n = 7. Suppose t>(1234) = 100, v(15) = 26, z/(1256) = 51, */(367) =26, and */(475)=26. Let v(S)=0 for all other SCN. Let (B = {1234, 5, 6, 7}. It can be shown that the payoff (25, 25, 25, 25,0,0,0) G-X^fô) does not belong to the classical bargaining set, however it does belong to the bargaining set defined above.
Finally, Nechemia [9] and Peleg [12] have given definitions of bargaining sets which use Theorem 1 to guarantee existence. Nechemia's set reduces to the classical set for side payment games, but he requires (B= {N} and the convexity of each Vs for existence. Peleg's definition, on the other hand, has general existence properties, while it does not reduce in the classical case.
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